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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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4 JAN 1974


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# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

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
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## ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

## MOSCOW MARKS TIME ON MIDEAST ISSUES, ISRAELI ELECTIONS

With the pause in the Geneva talks for Israel's 31 December parliamentary elections and the New Year holidays, Moscow marked time on the Middle East situation in year-end comment. Brezhnev, in his televised New Year's speech, remarked only that the USSR was making an active contribution to the defense of the Arabs' legitimate rights and to the establishment of a strong and just peace. Soviet leaders in speeches at award ceremonies in various republics touched on the Middle East in standard terms: Podgornyy in Riga and Andropov in Tallinn again called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and for insuring the interests of all states and peoples of the area, including the Palestinians. Podgornyy additionally pledged Soviet support for the Geneva conference and expressed hope that it would contribute to a stable and just solution.

Soviet media have not yet announced the forthcoming visit to Moscow of Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi, reported by Cairo's AL-AHRAM on the 3d; TASS on the 2d, however, reported the White House announcement that Israel Defense Minister Dayan would be holding talks with Secretary Kissinger in Washington on the 3d to discuss the Geneva conference and specifically the question of disengagement of Israeli-Egyptian forces. The Secretary's 27 December news conference was briefly summed up by TASS, which cited his remarks that Soviet policy was "constructive," that the Geneva conference was well launched, and that he hoped for some progress in the disengagement talks. TASS also noted his remark that this was only the beginning of a slow and agonizing effort to reconcile objectives that in many respects seemed contradictory.

Moscow has had little to say on the sessions of the military working group in Geneva; TASS noted without comment that the statement on the 28 December meeting said the participants had achieved identity of views on some principles of disengagement. And a TASS dispatch from Cairo on the 31st cited AL-AHRAM as saying that the sides had decided that the term "disengagement of troops" should include Israeli withdrawal from the west bank of the Suez Canal, that the distance between the opposing forces should be about 30 kilometers, and that the Suez Canal should be beyond the reach of Israeli artillery.

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ISRAELI ELECTIONS      Moscow portrayed the Israeli parliamentary elections as taking place in an atmosphere of "acute political crisis" marked by serious differences within the ruling coalition headed by the Labor Party and by increasing dissatisfaction within the electorate over the government's policy of "occupation and aggression." A Kapitonov article in the 25 December IZVESTIYA, like other comment, criticized the Labor Party platform, declaring that it again confirmed the Israeli leaders' reluctance to implement Resolution 242. The opposition rightwing Likud bloc was characterized by Moscow as being even more "extremist and predatory" than the Labor Party. A domestic service commentary by Aleksandrov on the 2d said the very near future would show how much the Israeli leaders were taking into consideration the "new realities" in the Middle East, but did not speculate on what effect the election results might have on progress at Geneva. TASS on the 3d, observing that the voters saw no great difference between the Labor and Likud programs, predicted that since no party gained a majority in the election, the talks to form a government coalition would be prolonged.

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## INDOCHINA

## HANOI ASSESSES PROGRESS SINCE PEACE AGREEMENT, LISTS TASKS

Vietnamese communist year-end propaganda repeated standard themes, maintaining that the Paris agreement was a "victory," that the United States and Saigon are attempting to sabotage the accord, and that the communist forces in the South are holding their own and strengthening their zone of control. This mixed appraisal was clearly reflected in a New Year's editorial in the North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, which observed that the communists had won a "great victory" but not a "final victory," and that "violent" fighting continues in the South. The editorial went on to explain, in terms occasionally used by Hanoi military commentators in the past year, that the present "victory" reflects the balance of forces in Vietnam, Indochina, and the world. It claimed that the "enemy is still strong and cunning" but that "we are now stronger than the enemy."

Some Hanoi comment acknowledged the massive scale of reconstruction and development problems facing North Vietnam. In particular, the 1 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial noted that there will be difficulties in the immediate future and that "the northern economy, following tens of years of destruction, cannot be rehabilitated in a few weeks or months." High-level attention to these domestic problems was reflected in a 27 December Hanoi radio report on a tour by First Secretary Le Duan through Thai Binh and Nam Ha provinces. The report summarized his remarks at various agricultural and industrial facilities, noting among other things that he criticized the wastage of land and manpower.

Le Duan stated that the North was "entering a new era" that requires the acceleration of economic restoration and development. In agriculture, he urged: "we must in the next two or three years exert our greatest efforts to satisfactorily solve the grain and food problem, develop new economic areas, advance agriculture a step further on the path to large-scale socialist production, and make the collective economy in cooperatives play a main role in the production of agricultural products and goods." Suggesting, as he has in the past, that the party is not adequately equipped to solve some of the DRV's peacetime problems, Le Duan warned that "any party member who is not exemplary in labor productivity and fails to develop his role" in implementing domestic goals "basically cannot fill his role in leading the masses." He added

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that the building of the party and improvement of its members must be linked with the "labor productivity movement and with the organization of agriculture, the consolidation of cooperatives, the realization of the technical revolution, and the building of new men."

#### USSR-PRG JOINT COMMUNIQUE CONDEMNS U.S. SUPPORT FOR SAIGON

Moscow used the 18-24 December USSR visit by a PRG delegation headed by PRG/NFLSV leader Nguyen Huu Tho as an occasion to voice unusual high-level criticism of U.S. actions in Vietnam. Soviet President Podgornyy initiated the attack in a speech on the 18th accusing Washington of supporting Saigon in its "sabotage" of the peace agreement--a charge not previously made in a speech by a top Soviet leader.\* Washington's backing for the GVN was again criticized in the joint communique at the conclusion of Tho's stay, and a Leontyev radio commentary following the visit berated the United States for not ordering a halt to Saigon attacks on PRG-controlled territory.

The joint communique on the PRG visit stated that the Soviet Union "strongly condemns the gross and systematic violations of the Paris agreement by the Saigon regime, which relies on support from the United States, and demands that they should be stopped immediately. . . ." The United States had not been criticized in other Soviet communiqués since the Paris agreement. A joint communique in April on a visit by PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh did not mention the United States in condemning alleged Saigon violations of the peace agreement, and one in July for DRV First Secretary Le Duan's visit did not even mention Saigon violations.

Moscow's more critical line began to emerge about three months ago: A joint communique on a Brezhnev trip to Bulgaria, dated 21 September, again accused Saigon of violating the accord; and a 1 October joint communique on Kosygin's visit to Yugoslavia went further to condemn the United States, albeit in restrained terms, saying that "the Saigon regime perpetrated breaches of the Paris agreement with U.S. support."

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\* For a discussion of Podgornyy's speech, see the TRENDS of 19 December, pages 15-16.

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Since last October low-level Soviet propaganda has endeavored to document the charge that the United States is implicated in violations of the Vietnam peace accord. Comment, including central press articles, has repeatedly cited alleged examples of U.S. activities contrary to provisions of the agreement, including the presence of U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam, military assistance to the Thieu government, and aerial reconnaissance over North Vietnam. The commentary by Aleksey Leontyev, broadcast by Moscow on 26 December, went even further than earlier comment in charging that the United States "could order a discontinuation of attacks against the liberated zone" and "punitive operations against the population, but it does not do so."

The TASS report on a meeting between Brezhnev and Tho gave no indication that the CPSU leader had echoed other criticism of the United States or even mentioned "violations" of the accord. Brezhnev on this occasion did laud the PRG and NFLSV as the "only real representatives" of the South Vietnamese people--a formula Moscow has failed to endorse on many occasions in the past. (The communique on Le Duan's visit last July had typically described the PRG as the only true "expressor of the aspirations" of the South Vietnamese. At a lower-level, however, a 15 November IZVESTIYA article had broken with the usual Soviet pattern and used the formula "only true representative.")

Brezhnev's meeting with the South Vietnamese reportedly was held "in a spirit of cordiality and fraternal friendship." The delegation's talks with other Soviet officials, led by Podgornyy, were described in the communique as having taken place in a atmosphere of "friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding." The term "frankness" suggests the existence of disagreements between the two sides, but the Vietnamese-language version of the communique used a word for frankness--"coi mo"--which has the less negative connotation of "open-heartedness."\*

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\* The same term "coi mo" was used in a joint statement on Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi in October 1971, in which unanimity on all questions was said to have been reached. A different term for frankness, "thang than," used during an unofficial Podgornyy visit to Hanoi in June 1972, has the more reserved meaning of "straightforwardness."

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The PRG delegation also concluded an agreement on Soviet economic aid for 1974, signed by Foreign Minister Binh and Vladimir Novikov, vice chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. According to TASS, the agreement provides for the supply of machinery and equipment, farm machines, oil products, fertilizers, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, medicines, food, and other goods. VNA, but not TASS, reported that the aid would be gratuitous. A similar agreement on aid for 1973 had been concluded on 1 August last year by a visiting PRG delegation.

#### SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION CONCLUDES VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

Moscow's harsher line toward U.S. policies in Vietnam was reflected during a 19-26 December visit to Hanoi of a Soviet delegation led by S.B. Niyazbekov, vice president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegation was received by President Ton Duc Thang, Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee Truong Chinh, and Premier Pham Van Dong, and it held talks with DRV officials, including Politburo members Truong Chinh and Hoang Van Hoan.

In speeches at a Hanoi meeting on the 22d and at a Soviet embassy banquet on the 25th, Niyazbekov condemned alleged Saigon sabotage of the Paris agreement, with the "support" of the United States. In this same vein, the joint communique at the conclusion of the visit said that both sides "sternly condemned the U.S.-abetted Saigon administration for its gross and systematic violations of many essential military and political provisions of the Paris agreement." The Soviet side, according to the communique, also expressed support for the DRV and the PRG, the "sole authentic representative of the South Vietnamese people," and for their stand of respecting the peace accord, and "resolutely demanded" that the United States and Saigon do the same.

North Vietnamese speeches during the visit reflected in a standard fashion Hanoi's evenhanded policy in dealing with its two major allies. Thus, Truong Chinh's speeches at banquets on the 20th and 25th lauded Chinese assistance to Vietnam as well as the assistance of the Soviet Union and other nations. In the latter speech he also underlined Hanoi's opposition to divisions among the communist nations, noting that the Vietnamese are "determined" to cultivate relations with the Soviet Union and "at the same time, they are endeavoring to contribute to restoring and strengthening the solidarity among the socialist countries and among communist and workers parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

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## CHINA

## MILITARY COMMANDERS SHIFTED IN SHOW OF CENTRAL PARTY CONTROL

The dominance of Chou En-lai's central leadership grouping was clearly demonstrated in the wholesale transfers of all of China's military region (MR) commanders who were also provincial party chiefs, revealed in a 1 January NCNA report on army-people gatherings on the occasion of the New Year. The moves reflect a general pattern, evident since the purge of Lin Biao, to reduce the independent power of the PLA, which grew to control China's political life during the turmoil of the cultural revolution. While none of the military commanders was purged, their transfer from areas where many had years of experience and personal loyalties will effectively reduce their power, even if some of them are given new civil posts to replace those they lost.

The moves were foreshadowed by arguments made in allegorical articles this past fall favoring Emperor Chin Shih-huang's repression of Confucianists in his attempt to establish a unified Chinese state. An article in the October RED FLAG stated the issue most clearly in praising Chin Shih-huang for dividing the empire into prefectures controlled tightly by the center, as opposed to the traditional, Confucian concept of appointing hereditary chiefs throughout the empire. With obvious reference to Mao, Lin, and Chou, the article told of conflict between the reactionary representative of the Confucianists and the legalist representative, who argued their case before the emperor. The emperor accepted the legalist opinion that the feudal lord system "was the source of division and civil war." Obvious targets for such concern were the military region commanders, whose long stay in an area has often tended to provide them with a personal power base for an "independent kingdom."

Two of the three Politburo members affected by the changes, Chen Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu, had long been resident in their regions and consequently were thought to have a measure of independent power. The third, vice chairman Li Te-sheng, was military and civil boss of Anhwei province, a post of lesser importance than a military region, so that his transfer is in some sense a promotion. Li is, however, also chief of the PLA General Political Department, a post he may have to forfeit should his new Shenyang MR duties force him to spend most of his time away from Peking. As Anhwei chief, Li stayed in Peking, as do a number of other provincial

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leaders who also hold central jobs; previously the military region commanders have stayed in their regions. Li and the other commanders seemed prime candidates for the posts of Defense Minister and Chief of Staff, vacant since Lin's death, and the transfers presumably affect jockeying for these posts.

The transfer of Chen Hsi-lien to the vacant Peking MR post seems a promotion, though the position has in recent years been highly susceptible to purges. Control of the army in this sensitive region is of especially great importance in view of Mao's increasing age and weakness, as the Peking troops might prove vital in case of a succession struggle. The importance of Chen's new position was underlined by the treatment accorded the Peking military region in the NCNA report on the changes. While the account seemed to follow the personal rank of the commanders in listing each in his new post, thus placing Vice Chairman Li above Chen, later in the account--in listing other attendees at the gatherings from the various regions--those from Peking were named first, followed by Shenyang. Chen's Shenyang base has been the leader this year, apparently in coordination with the dominant Chouist party group at the center, in making a strategic shift in line toward a strong defense of cultural revolution "new things," especially the reforms in educational policy. The policies defended do not portend any radical shifts, but are a reminder that a return to order does not imply a renunciation of revolutionary goals.

Besides the Li and Chen transfers, there were three direct trades between military regions: Hsu Shih-yu and Ting Sheng went respectively to Canton and Nanking; Yang Te-chih took over in Wuhan, while Tseng Ssu-yu moved over to Tsinan; and Han Hsien-chu left his Foochow base to the care of Lanchow commander Pi Ting-chun, the only transferred commander not a provincial party chief. While Hsu Shih-yu, as a Politburo member, can at least look forward to being the dominant figure in his area, the other commanders may have to accustom themselves to the idea of playing second fiddle. This has already happened to Han Hsien-chu, transferred to Lanchow, where MR commissar Hsien Heng-han has long been the dominant figure. A 2 January Lanchow radio account of their New Year's appearance listed Hsien first and Han second. Like the NCNA account, no provincial radios have yet accorded the new commanders any local civilian rank.

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## JOINT EDITORIAL STRESSES DOMESTIC STUDY, FOREIGN SUCCESS

The 1974 New Year's Day joint editorial by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY concentrated, like last year's, on domestic affairs, noting progress toward some long-range goals but stressing the continuing tasks ahead to improve ideological study, strengthen party leadership and achieve unity. The editorial indicated no new major departures in line for the immediate future, nor did it drop any hints that the National People's Congress would be convened soon, merely making passing mention of the need for achievements to greet the Congress. Unlike last year, when the PLA was credited with "new progress politically and militarily," the editorial did not praise PLA achievements but noted that the army should continue study, undergo further training and strictly observe discipline.

The editorial noted several achievements of the past year, most prominently the convening of the 10th CCP Congress. It hailed workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals for "mounting a new attack on the ideology of the bourgeoisie" and stated that "new socialist things grew." The good 1973 harvest was praised as a fruit of the anti-Lin campaign, with the editorial claiming a combined industrial-agricultural output more than eight percent above that of 1972. The editorial's omission of last year's call for consolidation of mass organizations seems to reflect basic completion of this task.

Most prominent of the continuing tasks laid down by the editorial is the need for further study and defense of the cultural revolution and its reforms. The editorial made a new call to "restudy the important instructions Chairman Mao has given" during the cultural revolution; no new Mao instructions were issued. As part of the study campaign, the editorial extended its usual list of suggested readings to include "some history books and novels," and noted that the anti-Confucius campaign must be continued as a "component part of the criticism of Lin." Intellectuals were warned not to backslide and were also told, by means of an old Mao quotation, of his hope that they would gradually acquire a communist viewpoint. Like the party congress documents, the editorial warned that party committees must not become bogged down in trivia and stressed that the party must lead all other sectors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS      The joint editorial's brief treatment of foreign affairs focused criticism on the Soviet Union in reporting alleged intensification of super-power rivalry for world hegemony as the major event of the past year. Thus, the editorial listed Moscow ahead of Washington as the chief predatory superpower, in contrast to last year when the United States was listed first. It maintained Peking's recent silence regarding an immediate Soviet threat to China, following the lead of the party congress documents in designating Europe as "the strategic focus" of superpower contention and charging that Moscow is stepping up its international expansion by making a "feint" to the East while devoting prime attention to grappling with the United States in Europe and the Middle East. Peking singled out Soviet attempts at expansion under the guise of international relaxation, noting specifically that Moscow's confrontation with Washington during the October Middle East war had "exploded the myth spread by Soviet revisionism about an international 'detente.'"

Reinforcing signs of current Chinese hostility toward Moscow, a bitter attack on the Brezhnev leadership was incorporated in this year's customary low-level greetings message to the Soviet people from a Chinese worker, broadcast by Peking in Russian on the 31st. In contrast to the bland 1973 message, this year's message, attributed to a Peking steel mill worker, accused the "renegade Brezhnev clique" of pursuing a "rabid anti-Chinese campaign" and charged that the clique's policy toward China had exposed its "genuine feature as a traitor to Lenin."

The joint editorial duly affirmed Peking's determination to fulfill its "sacred duty" by liberating Taiwan. Reflecting China's increasingly more conventional international approach, this year's editorial omitted the specific references found in those of previous years to Chinese support for revolutionary struggles, and dropped any mention of China's relations with "fraternal socialist countries." These themes were replaced by a generalized endorsement of third world struggles against the superpowers and by a bland affirmation of Chinese unity with "the proletariat and oppressed people and nations the world over."

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## NOTES

CULT OF BREZHNEV: Brezhnev's primacy in the Soviet leadership has gained wider recognition as a result of a sharp increase in the practice of electing the Politburo with Brezhnev "at the head" as the honorary presidium at ceremonial meetings. The practice was uniformly observed at all the republic awards ceremonies in late December--in Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, Latvia and Estonia. No such uniformity was evidenced at similar gatherings earlier in the year: the awards meetings in Uzbekistan in September and in Georgia in October bestowed the honorific title on Brezhnev, whereas the awards meetings in the Ukraine in July, in Kazakhstan in August, and in Belorussia and Lithuania in November merely elected honorary presidiums consisting of the Politburo, without any mention of Brezhnev. Although various ceremonial gatherings in Leningrad since September have chosen to honor Brezhnev as "head" of the Politburo, similar meetings in Moscow have not followed suit. Nevertheless, the central press has publicized the use of the honorific title at the recent republic awards ceremonies, and in one instance--the 21 December meeting in Tadzhikistan--the TASS report published in the central press included the use of the honorific title even though the extensive local account of the meeting contained no such formulation.

LE DUC THO RETURN FROM PARIS: Le Duc Tho returned to Hanoi on 3 January after meeting with Secretary Kissinger in Paris on 20 December and stopping briefly in Moscow and Peking. During his 27-31 December stay in Moscow Tho was received by Suslov, Ponomarev, and Katushev. CPSU Secretary Katushev had been the highest-level official to see Tho when he passed through Moscow on his way to Paris. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai did not meet with Tho during either his stopover in December on the way to Paris or his 1-3 January stop on his way home, although Chou had regularly received Tho on previous stopovers since June 1971. Peking's handling of the recent stopovers has been virtually identical, with Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao performing the host functions previously exercised by Chou.

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KIM IL-SONG NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS: The traditional New Year's address by North Korean leader Kim Il-song reflected a retreat from the atypically optimistic tone of his address last year. Unlike last year, Kim did not mention the discussions of the North-South Coordination Committee and the Red Cross organizations, which had been suspended in the last half of 1973. Returning to the language of addresses prior to 1973, Kim reiterated support for the "patriotic struggle" in South Korea--a subject not raised last year--and stressed the importance of the army's combat readiness. By contrast, the 1973 address had carefully pointed out the defensive nature of the DPRK armed forces. Kim's new address did not, however, go as far as those in January 1972 and earlier which had denounced the "Pak Chong-hui puppet clique" and demanded the immediate removal of U.S. troops from South Korea.

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# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 - 30 DECEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2558 items)</u>		<u>Peking (963 items)</u>	
Vietnam	(11%) 8%	Domestic Issues	(53%) 60%
[Nguyen Huu Tho	(6%) 3%]	Vietnam	(4%) 5%
in USSR		Korea	(4%) 5%
[Le Duc Tho in USSR (--)	3%]	Middle East	(7%) 4%
Middle East Peace	(10%) 6%	Asian Collective Security	(1%) 4%
Conference, Geneva			
[Gromyko Departure	(--)		
Speech, 24 Dec.	3%]		
China	(4%) 5%		
Soyuz 13 Flight	(5%) 3%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.